I just returned from the Power and Pathologies of Networks conference, organized by James Der Derian at the Watson Institute at Brown University, and held September 10 and 11th. It was a great conference, lots of good people, featuring a nice exhibit on the history of computer viruses.
Our OpenNet Initiative project released a new bulletin today on China’s filtering of Google’s cache, how this affects using it as an ad hoc form of circumvention, and some other details related to backbone filtering on search engines.
The Wall Street Journal did a piece profiling (reg req’d) this and our previous Bulletin, as well as some research that colleagues of ours at Berkeley did on SMS messenging filters in China.
And now the Bulletin has been Slashdotted…..
I’m not quite sure what this story from Die Zeit says about me or the Citizen Lab, but if you speak German it looks interesting.
We just released this report on Iranian censorship of the Internet, essentially verifying banned websites reported by RSF and stop.censoring.us.
Hacktivism and How It Got Here
Michelle Delio 07.14.04
NEW YORK — Hacktivism isn’t found in the graffiti on defaced Web pages, in e-mail viruses bearing political screeds or in smug take-downs of government or organizational networks.
These sorts of activities are nothing more than reverse censorship and “the same old cheap hacks elevated to political protest,” according to Cult of the Dead Cow member Oxblood Ruffin.
Internet Content Filtering in India: Variations in Compliance and Accuracy
We have just released this bulletin on some recent Internet content filtering patterns in India. The collateral blocking of a terrorist website is definitely weird, but story here is the compliance issue.
Another one, from Newsforge, about the OpenNet Initiative Advisory on the IBB/Anonymizer we just released.
I must object to Lance Cotrell’s comments about Iranian monitoring and our analysis of the insecurity of the IBB/Anonymizer system.
Does anyone really believe the IBB and/or State Dept has intelligence “on the ground” that determines how and when Iranians and Iranian ISPs are monitoring email traffic??? You mean, like the intelligence on the ground in Iraq about WMD??
Here is the first OpenNet Initiative Advisory (001) on the “Unintended Consequences and Risks of Circumvention Technologies: The IBB’s Anonymizer Service in Iran.”